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Abstract The number of persons under community sanctions and measures in the
criminal justice system have grown rapidly in many European countries. In response
to this phenomenon, the Council of Europe has issued several recommendations on
community sanctions and measures in recent decades. The European Union has also
published two framework decisions concerning community sanctions and measures
that are legally binding on its member states. This article examines the shifts of the
general legal philosophies of European instruments on community sanctions and
measures, through a review of the subtle changes in the rhetoric of these. Results
show that community sanctions and measures are increasingly promoted because of
their inherent value, rather than simply because they provide the means to reduce the
use of imprisonment. The European instruments assert interdependence between the
two objectives of offender rehabilitation and public protection, consider the indicators
related to both as the criteria for effective supervision, and understand community
sanctions and measures as being not only efficiency oriented but also based on
Europe’s human rights framework. However, a particular concern — risk management
of dangerous offenders — leads to looser interpretations of some principles of human
rights. To retain the European image of resisting punitiveness, this problem can be
addressed by firmer and stricter interpretation of these principles.
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Introduction
Throughout Europe, there are various definitions, forms, and configurations of community
sanctions. However, there are also some common trends. In many European countries, the
number of persons under community sanctions and measures continues to increase. Further-
more, the range of these sanctions is broadening, and their intensity is increasing (Graebsch
and Burkhardt 2014; McNeill 2013; McNeill and Beyens 2013; Stefani 2016). The SPACE I
and SPACE II Reports present the annual penal statistics of the Council of Europe (CoE)
member states. These reports show that, in many European countries in 2012, more people
were under the supervision or care of probationary services than in prison (Aebi and Chopin
2013; Aebi and Delgrande 2013). Some scholars label this phenomenon ‘mass supervision’
(McNeill 2013; McNeill and Beyens 2013; Phelps 2013).
Mass supervision reflects the commitment of European instruments to increasingly impose
community sanctions and measures(CSMs). Recommendation No. R(92)16 ‘On the European
Rules on Community Sanctions andMeasures’ has very recently been replaced and updated by
Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3 ‘On the European Rules on Community Sanctions and
Measures’ issued by the CoE. The CoE has also published several other recommendations on
CSMs. Albeit not legally binding, these recommendations can greatly influence member
states. Two measures that are binding for European Union (EU) member states, through
transposition into national law, are(1) Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA of 27
November 2008 ‘On the Application of the Principle of Mutual Recognition to Judgments
and Probation Decisions with a View to the Supervision of Probation Measures and Alterna-
tive Sanctions’; and (2) Council Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA of 23 October 2009 ‘On
the Application of the Principle of Mutual Recognition to Decisions on Supervision Measures
as an Alternative to Provisional Detention’.
This article reviews the penal policy of CSMs under these European instruments, referring
also to the related literature. There have been subtle changes in the rhetoric of these European
instruments. These reflect shifts and reconciliations in CSMs objectives and effectiveness
criteria. This article examines the general legal philosophies of European instruments on how
to resist punitiveness but maintain the punitive character of CSMs, how to balance protecting
society and rehabilitating offenders, how to correlate short-term offender compliance with the
long-term aim of desistance, and how to apply human rights standards with CSMs.
The objectives of community sanctions under European instruments
The objectives under the CoE’s recommendations
Reducing the use of imprisonment
The CoE has issued several recommendations on reducing imprisonment and promoting
CSMs. These recommendations support a reductionist policy. According to Rutherford
(1984, pp. 145-147), there are two general conditions of a reductionist policy: first, key
decision-makers share profound scepticism about the benefits of imprisonment; second, they
have profound intolerance of overcrowding in prisons.
The recommendations convey doubts about the effectiveness of imprisonment. They also
commit to tackle prison population inflation. Resolution (76)10 ‘On Certain Alternative Penal
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Measures to Imprisonment’ recognises that prison sentences have many drawbacks. It also
states that alternative sentences can ‘serve the object of rehabilitating offenders and are less
costly than imprisonment’.1 Subsequent recommendations on community sanctions and mea-
sures2, including reinforce Resolution (76)10 on the negative effects of imprisonment and the
potential for CSMs to avoid these problems. Recommendation No. R(99)22 ‘Concerning
Prison Overcrowding and Prison Population Inflation’ regards the deprivation of liberty as a
last resort. It states that ‘prison overcrowding and prison population growth represent a major
challenge to prison administrations and the criminal justice system as a whole, both in terms of
human rights and of the efficient management of penal institutions’.3 Recommendation
Rec(2006)2 ‘On the European Prison Rules’ reiterates that liberty should be deprived only
as a last resort. It also stipulates that minimum accommodation requirements must not be
breached by prison overcrowding.4
The recommendations use both ‘front-door strategies’ and ‘back-door strategies’ to reduce
the prison population. The front-door strategies involve imprisoning fewer people, while the
back-door strategies focus on shortening prison sentences on conviction (De Vos et al. 2014;
Snacken 2006; Tonry 2006). Resolution (76)10 aims to expand alternatives to imprisonment. It
calls on member states to develop both existing and new alternatives. Besides CSMs, it also
requires member states to use fines ‘as sanctions on a broad basis’,5 and semi-detention ‘as a
milder form of punishment than total imprisonment’.6 However, Recommendation No.
R(99)22 omits fines from its list of sanctions to solve prison overcrowding.7 This recommen-
dation requires member states to provide an appropriate array of CSMs, possibly graded in
terms of relative severity.8 It also requires member states to combine custodial and non-
custodial sanctions and measures;9 and use specific approaches in enforcing custodial
sentences. These include, for example semi-liberty, open regimes, prison leave, or extra-
mural placements.10
The CoE’s recommendations require wide use of CSMs. In replacing Recommendation Rec
(2000)22, Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)3 restates its key principles on this topic. The new
recommendation expects member states to provide for non-custodial sanctions or measures
instead of imprisonment as the appropriate response for certain offences in national laws.11
Member states are also expected to review and reduce formal provisions preventing CSMs use
for serious and repeat offenders.12 Many European jurisdictions have responded by broadening
the scope of offenders eligible for CSM.
Snacken (2006) maintains that ‘imprisonment as a last resort’ is the guiding principle in
European penal policies. Snacken’s (2006, p. 145) spatial comparative study shows that
1 Preamble, Resolution (76)10.
2 These recommendations include Recommendation No. R (92) 16, Recommendation Rec(2003)22 ‘On Condi-
tional Release (Parole)’, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1, and Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3.
3 Preamble and Rule 1, Recommendation No. R(99)22.
4 Preamble and Rule 18.4, Recommendation Rec(2006)2.
5 Rule 2b, Resolution (76)10.
6 Rule 3d, Resolution (76)10.
7 Recommendation No. R(99)22 should not devalue the role of fines in reducing prison population. In
Scandinavia and Germany, fines serves as a dominant alternative, and contributes effectively to low short-term
imprisonment rates (Dünkel 2017; Lappi-Seppala 2008).
8 Rules 3, 14, and 15, Recommendation No. R(99)22.
9 Rule 17, Recommendation No. R(99)22.
10 Rule 9, Recommendation No. R(99)22.
11 Rule 2, Recommendation Rec (2000)22; Rule 18, Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)3.
12 Rule 3, Recommendation Rec (2000)22; Rule 19, Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)3.
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European prison populations are modest and the level of punitiveness is low compared with
the dramatical increase in the US prison population in the US over the last 20 years.13
However, Aebi et al.’s (2015) temporal comparative study finds that the increase of CSMs
in Europe has no visible effect on prison population rates from 1991 to 2010 in European
countries.
Balancing protecting society and rehabilitating offenders
Under Resolution (76)10, CSMs are promoted because they overcome the problems of
imprisonment. CSMs are ‘only one of the items in a more comprehensive toolbox’ for
alternatives to imprisonment (Martufi and Slingeneyer 2017, p. 8). Under subsequent recom-
mendations, the ‘inherent value’ of CSMs beyond a simple means to reduce imprisonment has
been increasingly recognised (van Zyl Smit et al. 2015, p. 14).
Under Recommendation No. R(92)16, pursuing an alternative to imprisonment does not
justify recourse to any kind of sanction or measure:14
‘the application of community sanctions and measures must maintain a necessary and
desirable balance between, on the one hand, the need to protect society both in the sense
of the maintenance of legal order as well as the application of norms providing for
reparation for the harm caused to victims, and, on the other hand, the essential recog-
nition of the needs of the offender having regard to his social adjustment’.15
‘the implementation of penal sanctions within the community itself rather than through a
process of isolation from it may well offer in the long term better protection for society
including, of course, the safeguarding of the interests of the victim or victims’.16
The following European instruments on community sanctions and measures also aim to
balance protecting society with rehabilitating offenders, asserting that social inclusion can
enhance community safety.
Recommendation Rec(2003)22 stipulates that:
‘conditional release should aim at assisting prisoners to make a transition from life in
prison to a law-abiding life in the community through post-release conditions and
supervision that promote this end and contribute to public safety and the reduction of
crime in the community’.17
The more recent Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1 provides that:
‘probation agencies shall aim to reduce reoffending by establishing positive relation-
ships with offenders in order to supervise (including control where necessary), guide and
assist them and to promote their successful social inclusion; probation thus contributes to
community safety and the fair administration of justice’.18
13 The imprisonment rates have declined recently. According to Dünkel (2017), it is somewhat due to
decriminalising minor property offences and declining in registered crimes and convictions in Eastern European
countries, and partly because of the decreasing seriousness of registered crimes in the Netherlands, Germany and
Spain.
14 Preamble b, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
15 Preamble a, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
16 Preamble c, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
17 Rule 3 of the Recommendation Rec(2003)22.
18 Rule 1, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1.
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The Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3 reiterates the value of CSMs for
suspects, offenders and the community.19
As Snacken and McNeill (2012, p. 562) observe, ‘it seems that there is an emerging
consensus at European level that, whereas all penal sanctions, including deprivation of liberty,
aim at reducing reoffending and protecting victims and the general public, a particular
characteristic of probation measures is their emphasis on working with offenders in the
community and fostering their social rehabilitation and inclusion’.
The Objectives under Council of the EU framework decisions: facilitating CSMs
for foreigners
Council Framework Decisions 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA reinforces the CoE’s rec-
ommendations regarding the objectives of CSMs. These decisions also aim to facilitate the
social rehabilitation of sentenced persons, improve protection of victims and the general public
and ensure the due course of justice.20 They also seek to facilitate applying suitable probation
measures and alternative sanctions for offenders who live outside the state of trial or
conviction.21
As the EU develops its competence in ‘freedom, security and justice’22, it grows increas-
ingly dominant in encouraging the free movement of criminal justice (Baker 2013). Judicial
cooperation in criminal matters is fundamentally founded on mutual recognition (Vermeulen
and De Bondt 2014). The two aforementioned Council framework decisions are both based on
this core principle. They aim to promote effective and efficient judicial cooperation between
member states regarding community sanctions and measures.
States are more likely to impose custodial sanctions and measures on foreigners than on
nationals. This relfects the strong possibility of noncompliance with community sanctions and
measures among foreign suspects and offenders, due to the risk of absconding and language
problems, for example (De Wree et al. 2009; Morgenstern 2009; Ruggiero et al. 1998).
The mutual recognition of judgements and decisions enables foreign suspects or offenders,
regardless of where they are sentenced, to serve community sentences in the EU member state
in which they reside. This policy potentially increases the application of non-custodial
sanctions and measures to foreigners, though neither Council framework decisions directly
calls for this. Like the recent recommendations issued by the CoE, the two Council framework
decisions are designed to increase CSMs use on their own merits, rather than simply to replace
custodial sanctions and measures (van Zyl Smit et al. 2015, p. 17).
Mutual recognition of judgements and decisions on CSMs is understood to benefit both
offender reintegration and crime control. Transferring offenders to their home states may
facilitate their reintegration. This is because it avoids linguistic and cultural barriers, as well
as provides better access to services and social ties (De Wree et al. 2009; Morgenstern 2009).
Meanwhile, to ensure effective crime control, transferring sentenced persons at least partly
upholds the issuing states’ sentences. The framework decisions generally prohibit converting
imprisonment into an alternative sentence (De Wree et al. 2009). Unless one of the grounds for
refusal in the framework decisions applies, executing states should recognise issuing states’
19 Scope and Purpose of the Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3.
20 Article 1 (1), Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA; Article 2(1), Council Framework Decision
2009/829/JHA.
21 Id.
22 Article 1, Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union.
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judgements and decisions.23 Executing states must also enforce judgements and decisions
exactly as issued except where the nature or duration of the sanctions or measures are
incompatible with domestic law.24 Where sanctions and measures are adapted, they must
correspond as far as possible to those imposed in the issuing state25. When the duration of the
measure in the issuing state exceeds the maximum duration under domestic law, the adapted
period shall not be below the maximum duration provided for equivalent offences under
domestic law26. It means that the executing state must fully exploit its domestic sentencing
framework (Morgenstern and Larrauri 2013).
The effectiveness criteria of community sanctions and measures
The punitive shift
The punitive character of CSMs is uncertain when they are viewed as measures of clemency.
Snacken (2010) states that punitiveness is ‘a complex, not always clearly defined concept’.
Robinson (2016) and Snacken (2010) find that the prevalence of rehabilitative ideals, impris-
onment rates and prison conditions are often referred to as the parameters of punitiveness.
CSMs are traditionally the key domain for rehabilitative interventions, and enjoy the status of
an alternative to imprisonment (Robinson 2008, 2016). Therefore, the expansion of CSMs
seems to run counter to the trend of punitiveness. The public’s perception of CSMs has been
shaped by this traditional understanding of punitiveness (Beyens 2016; Morris and Tonry
1991; Robinson 2016; Robinson and McNeill 2015). As Morris and Tonry (1991) observe, in
the minds of most, CSMs are seen as lenient treatment or a ‘let off’.
In the post-1990s European instruments on CSMs, two key aspects have served to change
public perceptions of impunity. These are the broadened scope of criminals eligible for such
sentences and the increasing emphasis on public protection. The punitive weights have been
increasing, as reflected by various demanding conditions and obligations attached to CSMs.
There has also been increasing use of some pure controlling methods to facilitate offender
supervision, such as electronic monitoring.
The shift in focus of effectiveness criteria
Under Resolution (76)10, the utilitarian basis for using alternatives to imprisonment is their
greater cost effectiveness.27 In this sense, two approaches best accommodate cost reduction:
first, ordering payment of a fine without attaching conditions or obligations; second, imposing
collective CSMs, such as suspended sentences and early release, with no conditions other than
avoiding reoffending. Under Recommendation No. R(92)16, the effectiveness criteria for
CSMs shifted from cost effectiveness to public protection and offender rehabilitation. At that
point, effective control of offenders become a crucial indicator. Under Recommendation No.
23 Article 11, Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA.
24 Article 9 (1), Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA.
25 Id.
26 Article 9 (2) of the Council Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA.
27 Preamble of the Resolution (76)10.
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R(99)22 and Recommendation Rec2000(22), the credibility of CSMs depends on their
effective supervision and control of offenders.28
Recommendation No. R(92)16 particularly emphasises individualised CSMs programmes.
It requires the implementation of community sanctions and measures to be individually
adapted to the particular circumstances of each case.29 These stipulations are retained in
Recommendation CM/Rec(2017) 3.30
Collective measures do not usually involve much control, beyond the single condition of
avoiding reoffending. They mostly result in forms of unconditional release. By contrast,
individualised programmes usually attach different conditions and obligations to different
offenders according to their circumstances. This allows close oversight of their conduct in
the community (Martufi and Slingeneyer 2017, p. 10; van Zyl Smit et al. 2015, p. 16).
Recommendation No. R(99)22 and Recommendation Rec(2003)22 also stress the
individualisation of sanctions, deemed by the former to be part of a ‘coherent and rational
criminal policy’.31
‘The development of measures should be promoted which reduce the actual length of the
sentence served, by giving preference to individualised measures, such as conditional
release (parole), over collective measures for the management of prison overcrowding
(amnesties, collective pardons)’.32
Recommendation Rec(2003)22 defines conditional release as ‘the early release of sen-
tenced prisoners under individualised post-release conditions’.33 According to van Zyl Smit
et al. (2015, p. 16), ‘by its narrow definition of conditional, the recommendation may
inadvertently encourage the setting of conditions’.
The construction of compliance
For offenders subject to individualised CSMs programmes, their effective supervision and
control are closely linked with the offenders’ subsequent compliance with the criminal law. As
Mair and Canton (2007, p. 270) identify, CSMs are distinguished from imprisonment and other
punishments, as their objectives can only be achieved if offenders actively comply with the
conditions and obligations; if offenders do not comply, ‘an unenforced community penalty is
indistinguishable from impunity’.
It is widely recognised that compliance is an elastic concept with different dimensions.
Bottoms (2001, p. 89) proposes two dimensions of compliance with community sanctions.
First, ‘short-term requirement compliance’ concerns the specific legal requirements of CSMs.
Second, ‘long-term legal compliance’ means no reoffending. Robinson (2013) deems long-
term legal compliance as equivalent to desistance. Within Bottoms’ short-term category,
Robinson (2013, p. 28); Robinson and McNeill (2008) distinguish between behaviour that
technically conforms to rules and that which reflects genuine engagement with a particular
sanction and its purposes. The former only reflects the behavioural dimension of compliance,
labelled formal compliance. Conversely, the latter adds the attitudinal dimension, and so is
28 Rule 22, Recommendation No. R(99)22; Rule 15, Recommendation Rec2000(22).
29 Rule 70 and 71, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
30 Rule 32 and 33, Recommendation CM/Rec (2017) 3.
31 Preamble, Recommendation No. R(99)22.
32 Rule 23, Recommendation No. R(99)22.
33 Rule 1, Recommendation Rec(2003)22.
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regarded as substantive compliance. Robinson and McNeill (2008) formulated a dynamic
model of compliance. They advocate supervisors moving beyond formal compliance into
substantive compliance. They also note that, the signs of substantive compliance increase the
likelihood of achieving long-term compliance. According to Robinson (2013, pp. 40-41), the
definition of compliance is shaped by how the purposes of CSMs are understood. Concerned
only with their punitive character or managerial justice, we would prioritise the easily auditable
formal compliance. Conversely, if we emphasise rehabilitation or managing risk and long-term
public protection, we need to value both formal and substantive compliance. Bottoms (2001)
finds that long-term compliance could be achieved through cognitive-behavioural
programmes. Such programmes seek to alter an offender’s ways of thinking (disposition).
This is linked, in a two-way process, to altered behavioural routines. Such changes seem
particularly likely to have lasting effects (Bottoms 2001, p. 94). During the 1980s, the
cognitive-behavioural theory was applied to explain offender behaviours. This led to the
development of the risk-need-responsivity model of rehabilitation programmes. These
programmes became a main source of momentum for reviving rehabilitative optimism
(McGuire 2004; Robinson and Crow 2009).
Changes over time in the CoE’s recommendations on implementing CSMs reflect shifting
concerns on the different compliance dimensions. Recommendation No. R(92)16 is designed
to establish common CSMs ensure standards to provide just and effective application.34
Concerning the mechanisms of compliance, the recommendation’s Chapter X merely provides
the procedure for dealing with non-compliance or inadequate compliance.35 Recommendation
No. R(92)16 does not address how to develop comprehensive strategies for long-term
desistance. Compared with Recommendation No. R(92)16, Recommendation Rec2000(22)
subtly changes the rhetoric by committing to achieve more effective use of CSMs.36 Accord-
ing to the European Committee on Crime Problems (2014), Recommendation Rec2000(22)
aims to interpret and improve the implementation of Recommendation No. R(92)16. As
Morgenstern (2016, p. 2) states, this reflects a subtle shift of emphasis from justice to
effectiveness. For guidance on setting up effective programmes and intervention, Recommen-
dation Rec(2000)22 directly refers to the risk-need-responsivity model. This model provides
the criteria to guide offenders’ allocation to specific programmes and interventions.37 The
recommendation also refers to cognitive behavioural methods as widely accepted recent
research findings to develop programmes and interventions for offenders who have relapsed
into serious crime or are likely to do so.38
Subsequent recommendations on CSMs all underline the importance of adopting strategies
based on established theory to improve effectiveness. Recommendation No. R(99)22 partic-
ularly advocates the development and use of reliable risk-prediction and risk assessment
techniques, as well as supervision strategies.39 Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1 provides
guidance on the establishment and proper functioning of probation agencies.40 Its commentary
stresses that supervision should target rehabilitation and desistance41. To achieve the latter, it
34 Preamble, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
35 Rule 76 to Rule 88, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
36 Preamble, Recommendation Rec2000(22).
37 Rule 22, Recommendation Rec(2000)22.
38 Rule 23, Recommendation Rec(2000)22.
39 Rule 22, Recommendation No. R(99)22.
40 Scope and Application of Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)1.
41 Rule 76, Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1.
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endorses the good lives model of offender rehabilitation.42 The recommendation seeks to
establish a positive and professional relationship between the probation officer and offenders.
This should enable offenders to play an active role in the supervision process.43 When pure
controlling measures like electronic monitoring form part of probation supervision, this should
facilitate the effectiveness of rehabilitative programmes.44 Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)4
‘On Electronic Monitoring’ clarifies the limited effectiveness of formal compliance. As a pure
controlling measure, electronic monitoring can only ensure supervision and reduce crime
while in force. To seek longer term desistance from crime, it should be combined with other
professional interventions and supportive measures targeting offenders’ social reintegration.45
Even for dangerous offenders, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)3 ‘Concerning Dangerous
Offenders’ requires their risk management to have the long-term aim of safe reintegration into
the community.46
As the combination and entrenchment of Recommendation No. R(92)16 and Recommen-
dation Rec 2000(22), Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3 preserves the former’s stipulations on
noncompliance.47 Meanwhile, the Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3 reiter-
ates the following provisions of Recommendation Rec 2000(22). In determining any CSMs
conditions or obligations, the individual’s needs and risks must be considered to support
desistance. The principle is applied even for measures involving high levels of surveillance or
control.48 Like Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1, the new recommendation recognises the
effectiveness of sound professional relationships in engendering attitudinal and behavioural
changes. Likewise, it also recommends a package of sanctions and measures to accommodate
the different dimensions of compliance.49 The list of effectiveness criteria in the Commentary
to Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3 includes most of the targets in Recommendation No.
R(92)16. These include fulfilling public expectations of law and policy, reducing imprison-
ment, meeting offenders’ offence-related needs, and improving cost-effectiveness.50 Yet, the
top three listed criteria are the reconviction rate, the process of desistance, and formal
desistance.51 The recommendation identifies the reconviction rate as ‘one significant measure
of effectiveness’.52 However, it does not recommend absolute (low) targets for the reconvic-
tion rate to prove the effects of CSMs. Instead, it suggests the comparative assessment of
effectiveness. The effect of a particular CSM ‘should be carefully compared with the
reconvictions of comparable offenders receiving imprisonment as well as other sanctions
and measures’.53
There are, thus, strong signs of two recent trends in the recommendations. First, they
increasingly favour both the behavioural and attitudinal dimensions of compliance. Second,
they place high value on desistance. Effective implementation methods are being stimulated by
the research findings of ‘what works’, which primarily originate in Canada, the USA, and
42 Rules 66 and 67, Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1.
43 Rule 1, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1.
44 Rule 57, Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1.
45 Rule 8, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)4.
46 Rule 6, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)3.
47 Rule 62 to Rule 72, Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3.
48 Rule 23, Recommendation Rec 2000(22); Rule 37, Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3.
49 Rule 1, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1; Rule 31, Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3.
50 Rule 90, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
51 Rule 99, Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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England and Wales.54 The Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1 states that
‘countries can and should use evidence from other countries to develop their own practices’.55
However, the recommended cognitive behavioural methods are questioned by scholars from
countries not schooled in Anglo-Saxon traditions (Herzog-Evans 2013; van Zyl Smit et al.
2015). With a subtle change from the Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1, the
Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3 states that ‘Practices that have proved to be
successful in one country may be a promising idea to introduce elsewhere’.56 The new
Commentary uses ‘may’ rather than ‘can and should’. However, it lists no promising ideas
other than cognitive behavioural methods.
Human rights standards in the context of community sanctions
and measures
The rise of human rights issues
McNeill (2013, p. 5) contends that, when the punitive character of CSMs was uncertain, it
resulted in ‘the slower progress of human rights discourses in the field of community sanctions
and measures than in relation to imprisonment’. Those subjected to community sanctions and
measures were regarded as recipients of mercy. Therefore, they were deprived of the moral
basis for legitimate claims to any entitlements to CSMs and to fair treatment in the punish-
ment’s execution (McNeill 2013, p. 6). To reinforce UN Resolution 663 C (XXIV) ‘Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners’, the CoE issued Resolution (73) 5 ‘European
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners’. Subsequently, the CoE’s Committee
of Ministers adopted Recommendation No. R (87) 3 ‘On European Prison Rules’ (Coyle
2005). This renews emphasis on the precepts of human dignity and the commitment of prison
administrations to humane and positive treatment. In contrast, Resolution (76)10 gives alter-
natives to imprisonment a semblance of beneficence, and completely overlooks human rights
problems.
In the 1990s, the intrusive dimensions of CSMs attracted increasing attention. As Snacken
(2006, p. 160) observes, though CSMs are typically less interfering than imprisonment, they
nonetheless restrict freedom of movement. They may also hamper the enjoyment of other
rights and freedoms. From the offender’s perspective, particularly demanding forms of CSMs
are not always more lenient and less intrusive than imprisonment. Some CSMs, especially
those imposed on high-risk offenders, are very intensive and feature many punitive aspects. To
control high-risk offenders, Recommendation Rec (2000)22 even allows the possibility of
indeterminate CSMs. This conflicts with the earlier Recommendation No. R(92)16: ‘no
community sanction or measure shall be of indeterminate duration’.57 Recommendation Rec
(2000)22 stipulates that:
‘exceptionally, an indeterminate community sanction or measure may be imposed on
offenders who, by reason of a serious prior or current offence in combination with a
54 Rule 104, Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1.
55 Id.
56 Rule 98, Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3.
57 Rule 5, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
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specific personal characteristic manifestly pose a continuing grave threat to life, health or
safety in the community’.58
Recommendation Rec (2017)3 continues to allow indeterminate community sanctions or
measures.59 Durnescu et al. (2013); Graebsch and Burkhardt (2014) find that some offenders
under community sanctions perceive those sanctions to be excessively punitive. Consequently,
they can be anxious about the intrusion into their private life.
Accordingly, on CSMs, the CoE’s instruments require member states to refer to other
European human rights instruments and standards. Recommendation No. R(92)16 offers basic
criteria for combining the creation and use of CSMs with guarantees against curtailing
offenders’ fundamental human rights.60 Chapter 3 of Recommendation No. R(92)16, titled
‘respect for fundamental rights’, prescribes that:
‘no community sanction or measure restricting the civil or political rights of an offender
shall be created or imposed if it is contrary to the norms accepted by the international
community concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms’.61
Recommendation Rec (2000)22 states that:
‘the recourse to, and the implementation of, community sanctions and measures should
always be guided by respect for fundamental legal safeguards as enshrined in the
European Convention on Human Rights, and by the principles laid down in the
European Rules’.62
Recommendation Rec(2017)3 preserves and strengthens the human rights protections
under these two earlier recommendations.63 Other CoE instruments on CSMs,64 also set
human rights principles as basic values, and refer to other European human rights instruments
and standards.65
‘Respect for human rights’ is among the EU’s baseline values. In the context of criminal
law, the mutual recognition principle of EU legal instruments is based on mutual trust between
member states’ criminal justice authorities. This is derived from the consensus that ‘all can be
relied upon to respect fundamental rights and the other fundamental principles of Union law’
(Baker 2013, p. 90). Council Framework Decisions 2008/947/JHA and 2009/829/JHA also
endorse respect for fundamental rights and legal principles, as enshrined in Article 6 of the
Treaty on European Union. 66
Under both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR),‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment’.67 The ECHR labels this right as non-derogative
58 Appendix 1, Recommendation Rec (2000)22.
59 Rule 23, Recommendation Rec (2017)3.
60 Preamble b, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
61 Rule 21, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
62 Preamble, Recommendation Rec (2000)22.
63 Preamble b and Rule 4, Recommendation Rec(2017)3.
64 These instruments include Recommendation Rec(2003)22, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1, and Recom-
mendation CM/Rec(2014)4.
65 Rule 36, Recommendation Rec(2003)22; Scope and Application, and Rule 2, Recommendation CM/
Rec(2010)1; Preamble, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)4.
66 Article 1(4), Framework Decision 2008/947/JHA; Article 5, Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA.
67 Article 3, European Convention on Human Rights; Article 4, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union.
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(Ashworth and Horder 2013). According to Morgenstern and Larrauri (2013); van Zyl Smit
and Ashworth (2004), ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ can be interpreted in
one or both of two ways. One interpretation concerns the nature of the treatment or punish-
ment. Particular type of punishment should be outlawed because of their intrinsically ‘cruel
and unusual’ or ‘inhuman and degrading’ character. The other interpretation concerns, in this
context, the intensity of community sanctions and measures. If the severity of a punishment is
grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime(s), that punishment is also ‘inhuman
and degrading’.
Outlawing particular types of sanctions and measures
Concerning the nature of CSMs, under Recommendation No. R(92)16,
‘the nature of all community sanctions and measures and the manner of their imple-
mentation shall be in line with any internationally guaranteed human rights of the
offender. The nature, content and methods of implementation of community sanctions
and measures shall not jeopardise the privacy or the dignity of the offenders or their
families, nor lead to their harassment. Nor shall self-respect, family relationships, links
with the community and ability to function in society be jeopardised. Safeguards shall be
adopted to protect the offender from insult and improper curiosity or publicity’.68
These rules are preserved in Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3. 69
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) gives no clear guidance on what types of
CSMs are considered torture or inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment. The court
refrains from expressly listing prohibited acts (Long and Association for the Prevention of
Torture 2002). The ECtHR believes that human rights protection standards should be
interpreted with reference to present-day conditions. Also, as standards become increasingly
high, great firmness is required in assessing what constitutes a breach of fundamental values
(Long and Association for the Prevention of Torture 2002).
Although the ECtHR does not specify what forms of CSMs should be precluded, many
scholars contend that certain CSMs may violate human rights by their very nature. To judge
whether a particular CSM is inhuman or degrading, Morgenstern and Larrauri (2013); Snacken
and McNeill (2012) suggest consulting the reports of the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT). It should
be noted, though, that the CPT focuses on persons deprived of their liberty. The authors give
the example of surgical castration in the Czech Republic, considered by the CPT to amount to
degrading treatment. In its report to the Czech Government, the CPT cited the ethical problems
of serious physical and mental harm inflicted on an offender.70 The ethical issues in using
electronic monitoring, which manages risks through techno-correctional innovation, have
received considerable academic attention. Some studies show that electronic monitoring may
reinforce patterns of gender inequality, cause stigma and embarrassment for suspects or
offenders, and place stress on members of their households (Holdsworth and Hucklesby
2014; Jones 2014; Nellis 2015). Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)4 sets basic principles on
68 Rules 21 and 22, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
69 Rule 8, Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3.
70 Article 44 of the Report to the Czech Government on the visit to the Czech Republic carried out by the CPT
from 25 March to 2 April 2008 (CPT/Inf (2009) 8).
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ethical use of electronic monitoring. First, it emphasises that any decisions to implement
electronic monitoring should consider each suspect’s or offender’s specific conditions and
personal circumstances. Second, such monitoring should eschew inflicting intentional physical
or mental harm or suffering on a suspect or offender. Third, undue intrusiveness into the
private and family life of suspects, offenders, and other affected persons should be avoided.71
The legality principle
Concerning the intensity of community sanctions, the CFR sets clear legality and proportion-
ality principles to limit such penalties.72 The legality principle promotes predictability in
judging the legal consequences of one’s actions. It also protects individuals against arbitrary
political, prosecutorial, or judicial power, prohibiting punishment through restrospective
application of substantive new crimes or increased punishments (Gallant 2009, pp. 20-21).
Recommendation No. R(92)16 also prescribes the legality principle, making the credibility of
CSMs dependent on clear rules of conduct.73
Recommendation No. R(92)16 requires clear and explicit legal provisions on the conditions
and obligations of CSMs, and the consequences of non-observance. It also prohibits indeter-
minate CSMs.74 As van Zyl Smit (1993, p. 322) interprets, this requirement sets a clear limit
on the sentence length, precluding sentences that, cumulatively, are unacceptably harsh.
However, Recommendation Rec(2000)22 permits indeterminate CSMs in exceptional cases.
If offenders must ‘manifestly pose a continuing grave threat to life, health or safety in the
community’.75 The subsequent Recommendation Rec(2003)22 also allows indeterminate
conditional release ‘when this is absolutely necessary for the protection of society’.76 Most
recently, Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)3 continues to permit extended CSMs ‘in excep-
tional circumstances’.77 These changes demonstrate increasing attention upon the risk man-
agement of dangerous offenders. The Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)3
accepts that permitting indeterminate CSMs undermines legal prediction and, thus, ‘is contrary
to the purpose of developing the offender's autonomy in society’.78 However, the recommen-
dation does not challenge the legality of indeterminate CSMs. Under Recommendation CM/
Rec(2014)3, the legality of extended CSMs for dangerous offenders is secured ‘by means of
regular and independent monitoring’.79
The proportionality principle
Although the CFR prohibits disproportionate penalties, the ECtHR does not clearly explain the
meaning of ‘disproportionate’. Morgenstern and Larrauri (2013, p. 142); Snacken (2006, p.
158) note that the ECtHR loosely interpret ‘proportionality’. In its only case involving a choice
between incarceration and an alternative measure, the ECtHR did not interfere with the state’s
71 Articles 26, 27 and 28, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)4.
72 Article 49, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.
73 Preamble c and Rule 3, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
74 Rules 4 and 5, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
75 Appendix 1, Recommendation Rec (2000)22.
76 Rule 11, Recommendation Rec(2003)22.
77 Rule 23, Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)3.
78 Rule 23, Commentary to Recommendation CM/Rec (2017)3.
79 Rule 8, Recommendation CM/Rec(2014)3.
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decision to impose remand custody.80 As this case demonstrates, state authorities are not
required to impose only the least-interfering sentence (Snacken 2006, p. 162).
The proportionality principle is also weakened by the considerations of risk management.
Under Recommendation No. R(92)16,
‘the nature and the duration of community sanctions and measures shall both be in
proportion to the seriousness of the offence for which an offender has been sentenced or
of which a person is accused and take into account his personal circumstances’81.
However, under subsequent European instruments, the seriousness of the offence and the
offender’s culpability are not the only considerations for determining the severity of CSMs.
The sentencer should combine the proportionality principle with other factors, including ‘the
properly assessed risks of reoffending’ (Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1).82 Recommenda-
tion CM/Rec(2017)3 also stipulates that risks must be assessed as well as the individual’s
needs.83
Since the severity of CSMs is determined by multiple factors, sentencers need guidance on
the weight to apportion to each in deciding punishment intensity. Recommendation No. R
(92)17 ‘Concerning Consistency in Sentencing’ clearly designates the seriousness of the
offence as the primary consideration for sentence severity, ‘whatever rationales for sentencing
are declared’. 84 As interpreted by van Zyl Smit and Ashworth (2004, p. 560), this provision
means that ‘even if the relevant legal framework permits the sentencer to impose a particular
sentence for reasons of rehabilitation, deterrence or incapacitation, that sentence must comply
with the requirement that it should not be disproportionate’. This interpretation corresponds
with the reading of proportionality under the European Commission’s Communication (COM/
2011/0573) ‘Towards an EU Criminal Policy’. The communication calls for applying the
explicit requirement of proportionality under the CFRights. It also advocates adopting the
‘necessity test’ with regard to the type and level of sanctions. To be considered proportionate,
‘the sanction must be commensurate with the gravity of the conduct and its effects and must
not exceed what is necessary to achieve the aim’. 85 Therefore, for CSMs and for other
sentences, the punishment should not be more severe than is necessary, though it is not
mandated to be the least interfering. This applies regardless of whether a CSM, based on
assessed risks and individual needs, has restrictive or rehabilitative purposes.
Concluding remarks
CSMs were initially advanced as alternatives to imprisonment, aiming to overcome its
shortcomings, show respect for individual liberty, and save costs. However, under more recent
related instruments, CSMs are promoted due to their particular characteristics. Traditionally,
CSMs are the key domain of rehabilitation. As an integral part of the penal system, they also
share the common goal of penal sanctions in seeking to protect the public. European
instruments assert interdependence between the two objectives of offender rehabilitation and
80 Bouchet v. France (2001).
81 Rule 6, Recommendation No. R(92)16.
82 Rule 5, Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)1.
83 Rule 22, Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)3.
84 Rule 4, Recommendation No. R (92)17.
85 Article 2.2, Communication (COM/2011/0573).
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public protection. They consider the indicators related to both objectives as the criteria for
effective supervision and control. They also identify the role of cognitive behavioural methods
in connecting reducing risk with promoting rehabilitation. However, preoccupations with
assessing and managing risk have the potential to increase the punitiveness of CSMs. This
risks jeopardising offenders’ human rights, especially for those labelled as high risk.
Under European instruments, CSMs are understood to be efficiency-oriented and based on
Europe’s human rights framework (Morgenstern 2009). Increasing emphasis on offenders’
human rights and dignity is recognised to reflect growing resistance to punitiveness in Western
Europe (Tonry 2006; Whitman 2003). The European instruments on CSMs require member
states to conform with the general legal norms under human rights instruments. The underde-
velopment of legal principles in the context of CSMs has been widely recognized. van Zyl
Smit (1993, p. 330) observed, just after promulgation of the first CoE recommendation on
CSMs, ‘It is at the level of an analysis which attempts to derive standards from general legal
norms that the various international instruments are most useful’. However, as the specific
rules on CSMs are more detailed, particular concern over the risk management of dangerous
offenders includes looser interpretations of the legality and proportionality principles. The
recommendations on CSMs permit indeterminate sentence duration and include perceived
risks and individual needs in the assessment of proportionality. These provisions seem to
encourage greater intervention than is strictly necessary (van Zyl Smit et al. 2015). There are
two widespread beliefs among European scholars on this topic. First, to retain the European
image of resisting punitiveness, the European instruments on CSMs can moderate their penal
content by reference to the legal principles of human rights (Morgenstern 2009; Morgenstern
and Larrauri 2013; Snacken and McNeill 2012). Second, the instruments can promote firmer
and stricter interpretation of legal principles under human rights instruments (Snacken 2006;
van Zyl Smit and Ashworth 2004; van Zyl Smit et al. 2015). Interpretations on the legal
principles of human rights need to handle the conflict between risk management and protection
of offenders’ rights. Resolving this conflict is a role for the European instruments. The
European instruments should present the European conception of resisting punitiveness, and
balance protection of offenders’ rights against risk management.
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